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Equity, or the lack thereof, in Michigan Lender Liability Jurisprudence: Crown
Technology and the Lender Liability Amendment to the Michigan Statue of
Frauds.  
By Aaron Keyes 
Introduction 
In 1992, the Michigan legislature passed an amendment to Michigan’s statue of frauds
barring claims by borrowers against financial institutions based on oral agreements.1  In 2000, in
Crown Technology v. D & N Bank2, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that one of the traditionally
recognized equitable exceptions to the statute of frauds, promissory estoppel, did not apply to the
lender liability amendment.3  This decision has left lenders free to breach oral agreements with
borrowers at will.  
The Court of Appeals’ decision in Crown Technology contains a number of flaws, including
the Court of Appeals’ failure to consider Michigan Supreme Court precedent, the Court of Appeals’
failure to consider the purposes underlying the estoppel exceptions to the statute of frauds, and the
Court of Appeals’ blanket and unequivocal statements regarding the legislative intent behind the
lender liability amendment to Michigan’s statue of frauds.4  However, it is likely that despite these
flaws, the Crown Court’s textualist argument would be affirmed by the current Michigan Supreme
5National Farmers Organization, Inc. v. Kinsley Bank, 731 F.2d 1464, 1467 (10th Cir.
1984).
6Id.
7Id.
8Id.
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Court, if the Supreme Court considered the same issues today.  Accordingly, to protect borrowers
from unsavory lending practices, the Michigan legislature should amend the statute of frauds to
include a notice provision regarding the invalidity of oral agreements, an exemption to the lender
liability portion of the statute of frauds for personal, family, and household loans, and a codification
of the promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds.  
Statement of the Problem 
The Crown Technology Court’s holding that  the promissory estoppel exception to the statute
of frauds does not apply to the lender liability portion of the Michigan statute of frauds leaves
borrowers virtually defenseless in the face of unscrupulous lending practices involving oral
agreements.  This problem can be better illustrated by considering the case of Ken Burkhart.  Mr.
Burkhart, who made his living raising and trading sheep in Kansas, had done business with Kinsley
Bank for a number of years, during which time the bank granted him loans ranging from $1,000 to
$20,000.5  During the course of his regular business, Burkhart became interested in purchasing a
large number of lambs from the National Farmers Organization (“NFO”).6  To facilitate this
purchase, he contacted the president of Kinsley who agreed to loan Burkhart the money necessary
to purchase the animals.7  Following this oral agreement, a representative of the NFO called the bank
and verified that the loan had been approved.8  Burkhart then proceeded to pay the NFO a down-
9Id.
10Id.
11Id.
12Id.
13Id.
14Id. at 1466.  
-3-
payment of approximately $18,000 from a check drawn on Kinsley bank.9  This check cleared, and
shortly thereafter, Burkhart began to take delivery of the lambs.10  To pay for the first truckload of
lambs, Burkhart drew another check for $75,861 from his account at Kinsley Bank.11  The bank
dishonored Burkhart’s check, and in a stunning about face, the bank president who had approved the
loan informed Burkhart that the bank would not honor his oral commitment to Burkhart.12  Burkhart
was unable to pay the NFO and suffered considerable financial loss as a result.13  Burkhart then
brought suit against the bank and was able to recover the damages he incurred as a result of the
bank’s breach of its president’s oral agreement to him.14   This common sense result seems just and
equitable.  However, under the Michigan Court of Appeals’ holding in Crown Technology, were this
same set of facts to occur in Michigan today, Mr. Burkhart’s claims would have been dismissed on
a motion for summary disposition, and he would have no recourse.  This type of unjust result, and
its possible remedies, are the focus of this paper. 
Background
The statute of frauds was enacted by parliament in 1677 to protect against perjured
15John L. Culhane, Jr., & Dean C. Gramlich, Lender Liability Limitation Amendments to
State Statutes of Frauds, 45 Bus. Law. 1779, 1782 (1990) (“article constitutes the report
submitted to the Committee on Consumer Financial Services and to the Committee on
Commercial Financial Services by the Task Force on Lender Liability Limitation Amendments to
State Statutes of Frauds”).  
16Id. at 1782.  
17Id.
18Id.
19Id.
20Id. at 1783; Opdyke Investment Co. v. Norris Grain Co., 320 N.W.2d 836, 840 (Mich.
1982); Lovely v. Dierkes, 347 N.W.2d 752, 753 (1984); McMath v. Ford Motor Co., 259
N.W.2d 140, 142 (1977).
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testimony.15   Originally, the statue of frauds applied only to certain contracts which, “by their very
nature were thought to mandate the greater reliability afforded by a signed writing.”16  The types of
contracts most often subject to the statue of frauds include contracts for the transfer of interest in real
estate, marriage contracts, an agreement by the executor of a will to pay the deceased’s debts,
guaranty agreements, and agreements which by their terms can not be performed within one year of
their making.17  Currently, the statute of frauds has been incorporated into the common law of almost
every state.18  Despite its widespread current usage, a rigid application of the statute can lead to
injustice, and accordingly, the courts in Michigan and many other jurisdictions have adopted
equitable exceptions to the statue of frauds.19  In the case of Michigan, these equitable doctrines
include a partial performance exception to the statute as it relates to real estate contracts, and
equitable and promissory estoppel exceptions to the statute’s other provisions.20   
During the 1980's, an alleged increase in litigation in which borrowers’ sued lending
institutions for these institutions’ supposed breach of oral contracts led the banking industry to lobby
21Id. at 1779-1780.  
22Todd C. Pearson, Limiting Lender Liability: The Trend Toward Written Credit
Agreement Statutes, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 295, 296-297 (1991); Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of
Lender Liability, 1989 Yale L.J. 131, 131-132. 
23Journal Of The House Of Representatives Of The State Of Michigan 1992 Regular
Session 86th Legislature, Volume 2, page 1777; House Legislative Analysis Section, 1992, Bill
5968, page 1.  
24Journal Of The Senate Of The State Of Michigan 1992 Regular Session, Volume 3,
page 2256; Journal Of The House Of Representatives Of The State Of Michigan 1992 Regular
Session 86th Legislature, Volume 3, pages 2294, 2612.    
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for the addition of statute of frauds lender liability provisions.21  In response, a majority of the states
adopted lender liability amendments to protect lending institutions.22   In Michigan, an amendment
to the statute of frauds was introduced in the state House of Representatives in 1992.23  This bill,
which became Public Act 245 of 1992, was unanimously passed in the state house and senate and
immediately signed into law by the governor.24  
The lender liability amendment to the Michigan statute of frauds took effect on January
1, 2003, and is codified as MCL § 566.132 (2)-(3).  It states as follows:  
(2) An action shall not be brought against a financial institution to enforce any  of the
following promises or commitments of the financial institution unless the promise
or commitment is in writing and signed with an authorized signature by the financial
institution:
(a) A promise or commitment to lend money, grant or extend credit, or make any
other financial accommodation.
(b) A promise or commitment to renew, extend, modify, or permit a delay in
repayment or performance of a loan, extension of credit, or other financial accommodation.
© A promise or commitment to waive a provision of a loan, extension of credit, or
other financial accommodation.
Financial institution defined. 
(3) As used in subsection (2), "financial institution" means a state or national
chartered bank, a state or federal chartered savings bank or savings and loan
association, a state or federal chartered credit union, a person licensed or registered
25Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132 (2)-(3) (2005).
26Crown Tech. Park v. D&N Bank, F.S.B., 619 N.W.2d 66 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
27Cortlan H. Maddux, EMPLOYERS BEWARE! The Emerging Use of Promissory
Estoppel as an Exception to Employment at Will, 49 Baylor L. Rev. 197, 198 (1997).
28Martin v. East Lansing School District, 483 N.W.2d 656, 662 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992);
Dumas v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 425 N.W.2d 480, 490 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
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under the mortgage brokers, lenders, and servicers licensing act, Act No. 173 of the
Public Acts of 1987, being sections 445.1651 to 445.1683 of the Michigan Compiled
Laws, or Act No. 125 of the Public Acts of 1981, being sections 493.51 to 493.81 of
the Michigan Compiled Laws, or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof.25
In Crown Technology, the Michigan Court of Appeals confronted the issue of whether
Michigan’s promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds applied to the lender liability
portion of the statute of frauds.26 Before discussing the Court of Appeals’ holding in Crown
Technology, a brief overview of Michigan’s estoppel exceptions to the statute of frauds is
appropriate.  Traditionally, promissory estoppel has been used as a defensive legal theory which was
invoked to prevent the opposing party from shirking its contractual obligations by, “asserting the
absence of a traditional contract requirement...,” or by, “asserting a failure of the writing requirement
imposed by the statute of frauds.”27  To prove a claim of promissory estoppel, the following elements
must be established: 
(1) there is a promise, (2) that the promisor should reasonably have expected to
induce action of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee, (3)
which in fact produced reliance or forbearance of that nature, (4) in circumstances
such that the promise must be enforced if injustice is to be avoided.28   
Whether or not promissory estoppel should be applied is based on the specific circumstances
of a given case, and as an equitable remedy, it is used to correct the injustice which can result form
29Hebrew Teachers v. Jewish Welfare, 233 N.W.2d 184, 188 (1975).
30McMath v. Ford Motor Company, 259 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
31Wolverine-Pentronix, 205 N.W.2d 504, 506 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973).
32Indus. Maxifreight Servs. v. Tenneco Auto. Operating Co., 182 F. Supp. 2d 630, 636
(E.D. Mich. 2002).
33Kelly-Stehney & Assocs. v. MacDonald's Indus. Prods., 658 N.W.2d 494, 500  (Mich.
Ct. App. 2003).
34Lakeside Oakland Dev, L.C. v. H & J Beef Co, 644 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Mich. Ct. App.
2002).
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strict adherence to established legal principles and/or doctrines, such as the statute of frauds.29  In
order for the promise at issue to be sufficient to support estoppel, it must be definite and clear.30  In
addition, to assert promissory estoppel as a defense to the statute of frauds, the individual asserting
promissory estoppel must have acted to his detriment solely in reliance on the oral agreement at
issue.31   Lastly, “Michigan courts apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel cautiously, and only
where the facts are unquestionable and the wrong to be prevented undoubted.”32   
The equitable estoppel exception to the statute of frauds is intimately linked to the
promissory
estoppel exception.  Equitable estoppel is not a distinct cause of action like promissory estoppel, but
instead, a doctrine which may preclude the opposing party from asserting or denying the existence
of a given fact.33  Equitable estoppel can arise where, “(1) a party, by representations, admissions,
or silence intentionally or negligently induces another party to believe facts, (2) the other party
justifiably relies and acts on that belief, and (3) the other party is prejudiced if the first party is
allowed to deny the existence of those facts."34  The estoppel exceptions moderate the statute of
35Crown Tech. Park, 619 N.W.2d at 70-74.
36Id.
37Id. at 68.
38Id. 
39Id.
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frauds and have helped Michigan Courts avoid injustice for many years.  However, in Crown
Technology, the legitimacy of the equitable exceptions to the Michigan statue of frauds was seriously
questioned, and the scope of their application was limited to the pre-amendment statue of frauds.35
In Crown Technology, the Michigan Court of Appeals applied amended MCL § 566.132 in
a way which would have far reaching consequences on lender liability in Michigan.36  The dispute
at issue in Crown Technology was between D& N Bank (“D& N”), a lending institution incorporated
in Michigan, and Crown Technology, a Michigan partnership created in 1985 to construct and
operate an office building in Warren, Michigan.37  In 1987, D& N loaned Crown Technology
$720,000 to refinance the Warren office building and secured this loan with a mortgage on the
property.38  The refinancing agreement required that Crown Technology make monthly payments
until March 19, 1997, at which time all of the unpaid principal and accrued interest on the
refinancing loan would become due.39   In conjunction with the refinancing agreement, the parties
executed a promissory note containing a prepayment penalty clause which stated: 
The indebtedness evidenced by this note may not be prepaid, in full or in part, prior
to March 1, 1997. In the event of acceleration of payment prior to such time, for any
reason whatsoever, Maker [Crown Technology] shall pay the holder hereof, in
addition to the principal balance, accrued interest, penalties and any other amounts
due hereunder, additional interest equal to the interest which would have accrued to
40Id.
41Id.
42Id.  
43Mr. Stefani’s first name is not mentioned by the Court of Appeals in Crown.  
44Id. 
45Id.
46Id.
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such date.40   
After executing the Crown Technology loan, D & N sold ninety percent of the loan to an
insurance company; however,  D& N continued to service the loan.41  In December of 1991, D & N
became aware that the Warren property’s original tenant had vacated the property, although the
tenant continued to pay rent to Crown Technology.42  This situation concerned D & N, and over the
next several years, bank officers communicated regularly with Crown Technology’s counsel, Mr.
Stefani43, to determine what steps Crown Technology was taking to find a new tenant, while closely
monitoring and evaluating the status of the loan.44  In April of 1994, Stefani met with Jamie Muter,
a commercial loan officer at D & N, and discussed the possibility of leasing the Warren property to
a new tenant who required the addition of a 3,000 square foot parking garage to the property.45
Subsequent to this meeting, Stefani informed Muter that Crown Technology was interested in
obtaining a new loan of $1.4 million dollars  with a ten-year fixed interest rate  in order to finance
the parking garage addition.46  D & N responded to Crown Technology’s request by offering a loan
47Id.
48Id. at 68-69.
49Id. at 69.
50Id. 
51Id.   
52Id. at 70.
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in the requested amount with a five-year fixed interest rate.47   These terms were not acceptable to
Crown Technology, and Stefani, “told Muter that Crown Technology was negotiating  with other
lenders who had agreed to extend a ten-year fixed rate and asked Muter whether ‘there was going
to be any problem with [Crown Technology] paying off this loan early.’”48   Stefani testified that
Muter replied to his request in the following manner:  
[']I checked and there's no prepayment penalty[,'] or . . . words to that effect. He
definitely [led] me to believe that he had checked--he didn't say who he checked with
or what he checked--but he said . . . [']I've already checked and there will be no
problem with you paying off the loan or there will be no prepayment penalty.[']49
After learning that D & N would not change the terms of its loan offer, Stefani proceeded to
refinance through another lender, and in June of 1994, Stefani contacted Muter and D & N to arrange
an early pay off of the loan in September of 1994.50  Crown Technology’s prepayment request was
rejected, and Stefani was informed by Muter that the loan was closed to prepayment until maturity.51
After several unsuccessful attempts by Stefani to convince D & N to change its position with regard
to prepayment, Crown Technology paid D&N a prepayment penalty of $ 66,378.67.52
Crown Technology then brought suit against D & N and was awarded $39,827.20 with
53Id. at 67.
54Id.
55Id. at 71.  
56Lovely v. Dierkes, 347 N.W.2d 752 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
57Crown Tech. Park,  619 N.W.2d at 71.  
58Id. at 71 (Citing Lovely v. Dierkes, 347 N.W.2d 752 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)).  
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interest on its claims of promissory estoppel and negligence.53  D & N appealed the trial court’s
denial of its motions for summary disposition and judgment notwithstanding the verdict,  and this
appeal was considered by a three judge panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals.54  D& N’s primary
claim on appeal was that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss Crown Technology’s claims
against it based on the lender liability amendment to MCL § 566.132.55 
Justice Zahra began his majority opinion by acknowledging that in Lovely v. Dierkes56, the
Court of Appeals held that promissory estoppel could bar the application of the statute of frauds in
cases where an application of the statute would lead to an inequitable result.57  Following this
acknowledgment, Justice Zahra criticized the Lovely Court’s conclusion and cited Judge Peterson’s
dissent:  
As noted by Judge Peterson in his dissenting opinion in Lovely, supra at 493, [‘]we
start any discussion of the statute of frauds with the posit that its application may
result in substantial injustice. Real and honest contracts will not be enforced because
of the statute of frauds; honest [people] will lose the benefits of their bargains
because they neglected to reduce them to writing.[‘] Given this premise, the role of
the judiciary is to apply the statute of frauds as written, without second-guessing the
wisdom of the Legislature.58 
59Id.
60Id.  at 72 (Citing Kiesel Intercounty Drain Drainage Dist v. Dep't of Natural Resources,
575 N.W.2d 791 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
61Id.
62Id.  at 73-74.  
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Despite this criticism, the majority declined to explicitly overturn Lovely, “[n]otwithstanding
our serious concerns, we need not determine whether Lovely was wrongly decided, because
legislative amendments of the statute of frauds enacted in 1992 clearly provide that a viable claim
of promissory estoppel cannot be asserted in the present case.”59  The majority went on to hold that
the MCL § 566.132 (2)’s language was unambiguous, and that if a statute’s language was
unambiguous, it should be enforced as written.60  In addition, the majority noted that, in its opinion,
it would be illogical for the legislature to add the lender liability provision to the statute of frauds
if at the same time, the legislature intended for the traditional promissory estoppel exception to the
statute of frauds to remain in effect.61  The Court concluded that Crown Technology’s promissory
estoppel claim should have been disposed of pursuant to D & N’s motion for summary disposition,
while the Court also dismissed  Crown Technology’s negligence claim due to its determination that
the negligence claim  was based upon the failure of D & N to abide by its oral promise to Crown
Technology.62 
The effects of Crown Technology reach well beyond the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that
the promissory estoppel exception may not be applied to the lender liability portion of the statute of
frauds.  It seems apparent that the analysis and holding of Crown Technoloy not only prohibit an
application of the promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds to the lender liability portion
63Estate Props., Inc. v. Ann Arbor Commerce Bank, B. Ross Co., 2003 Mich .App.
LEXIS 1761 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003)(holding that lender liability portion of statute of frauds
precluded negligent action). 
64Crown Tech. Park,  619 N.W.2d at 71.  
65Id. at 72-74.
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of the statute, but would also prohibit  the other equitable exceptions to the statute of frauds from
being applied to the lender liability portion of the statute.  Moreover, the Crown Court’s decision to
bar Crown Technology’s negligence claim, based on its relation to the oral agreement at issue,
essentially precludes any type of claims against lending institutions which have as part of their basis
an allegation of an oral promise that was not honored.63         
Analysis 
In Crown Technology, the Court of Appeals failed to acknowledge Michigan Supreme Court
precedent regarding equitable exceptions to the statue of frauds.
In Crown Technology, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that pursuant to Lovely v.
Dierkes, a promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds does exist in Michigan.64  After
making this acknowledgment, the Crown Court strongly criticized Lovely, before concluding that
the Lovely Court’s holding regarding the promissory estoppel exception was not applicable to the
lender liability portions of the statute of frauds.65  The flaws in this argument will be addressed in
more detail later in this analysis; however, prior to that discussion, it is necessary to note that at the
time Crown Technology was decided, Lovely was not the primary authority on the promissory
estoppel exception in Michigan.  In fact, there existed a more persuasive authority recognizing this
exception which the Court of Appeals in Crown Technology failed to acknowledge, namely, the
66Opdyke Investment Co. v. Norris Grain Co., 320 N.W.2d 836 (Mich. 1982).
67Id. at 837.
68Id. at 838.
69Id. 
70Id. at 837.
71Id. 
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Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Opdyke Investment Co. v. Norris Grain Co.66  Had the Court
of Appeals noted the Michigan Supreme Court’s stance on promissory estoppel,  perhaps it would
have been less willing to summarily dismiss the possibility of the promissory estoppel exception to
the statute of frauds applying to all of the statute of frauds, including the 1992 lender liability
amendments.  
In Opdyke, the Michigan Supreme Court considered a dispute stemming from an ill-fated
attempt to build a hockey arena next to the Pontiac Silverdome.67  The plaintiff claimed that the
defendants breached a valid and enforceable contract to jointly develop the arena on the plaintiff’s
property when the defendants instead chose to build what is now known as Joe Louis Arena in
downtown Detroit.68  In support of his argument, the plaintiff asserted that the essential terms of the
alleged contract were embodied in a letter of intent.69  However, the trial court granted summary
disposition in favor of the defendants based on its conclusion that the letter was at best an
unenforceable, “agreement to agree and an insufficient memorandum to satisfy the statue of
frauds,”while the court also noted that the letter was never accepted by “delivery back.”70   The
plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the breach of contract claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court.71  
72Id. at 840.
73Id. at 842.
74Kelly-Stehney & Assocs. Inc. v. MacDonald's Indust. Prods., 658 N.W.2d 494 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2003), Appeal granted by, Kelly-Stehney & Assocs. v. MacDonald's Indus. Prods., 664
N.W.2d 222 (Mich. 2003), Vacated and Remanded by, Kelly-Stehney & Assocs. v. Macdonald's
Indus. Prods., Inc., 2004 Mich. LEXIS 735 (Mich. 2004).
75Id. at 498-99.
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The Opdyke Court began its analysis by acknowledging that the equitable doctrines of partial
performance, equitable estoppel, and promissory estoppel had developed as exceptions to the statute
of frauds in order to “to avoid the arbitrary and unjust results required by an overly mechanistic
application of the rule.”72  After determining that the letter at issue was sufficiently specific to satisfy
the statute of frauds, the Supreme Court analyzed the promissory estoppel claim and concluded:  
In this case, disputed questions of fact exist as to whether a noncontractual promise
was made by the defendants and reasonably relied upon by the plaintiff. Since the
statute of frauds only applies to certain "contracts", recovery based on a
noncontractual promise falls outside the scope of the statute of frauds. The plaintiff's
alternate theory of promissory estoppel is sufficiently pleaded and supported to
survive the defendants' motion for accelerated judgment based on the statute of
frauds.73
In Kelly-Stehney & Associates, Inc. v. MacDonald's Industrial Products Inc.,74 a 2003
decision,  the Court of Appeals again was forced to address the validity of an equitable exception
to the statute of frauds.  However, in this case, a portion of the pre-amendment statute of frauds was
at issue; the exception to the statute of frauds being considered was equitable estoppel; and the Court
of Appeals recognized the Michigan Supreme Court’s acknowledgment  of the equitable exceptions
to the statute of frauds, as opposed to merely criticizing  Lovely v. Dierkes as the court had done in
Crown Technology.75  Tellingly, in Kelly-Stehney, the Court of Appeals grudgingly upheld the
76Id. 
77Id.
78Id. at 496.  
79Id. at 496-97.
80Id.    
81Id. at 497.
82Id.
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validity of the promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds.76  In reaching this conclusion,
the Court of Appeals showed considerable deference to the Michigan Supreme Court’s holding in
Opdyke.77  Had this same level of deference been applied in Crown Technology, the Court of
Appeals may have reached a different conclusion regarding the application of the promissory
estoppel exception to the lender liability provision of the statute of frauds.  
The dispute in Kelly-Stehney centered around an oral extension and modification of an
employment agreement, and as in Crown Technology, Justice Zahra delivered the majority opinion.78
The modification at issue in Kelly-Stehney created a reduced sliding scale of commissions for the
plaintiff.79   MacDonald’s Industrial’s president, Robert McDonald, claimed that Edward Stehney,
one of the plaintiff’s main shareholders, orally assented to the agreement, and that without the sliding
scale agreement, the original employment agreement between the parties would not have been
extended.80  After McDonald’s Industrial terminated the employment agreement in January of 2000,
the plaintiff demanded that it be paid for its services in 1999 and 2000 at the rate set out in the
original employment agreement.81  When the defendant refused, the plaintiff brought suit, arguing
that the statute of frauds barred the oral extension/modification from being considered.82   The trial
83Id. 
84Id. at 498-99.  
85Id. at 499 (Citing  Lovely v Dierkes, 132 Mich. App. 485, 493; 347 N.W.2d 752 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1984); Crown Technology Park v. D&N Bank, 242 Mich. App. 538, 548;  619 N.W.2d
66 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); and, Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law
14-29 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1997). 
86Id.   
87Id. at 500-504.  
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court concluded that the statute of frauds did not bar the oral agreement from being considered and
granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition based on equitable estoppel.83
Writing for the majority, Justice Zahra reluctantly acknowledged that the Michigan Supreme
Court  recognized the equitable estoppel exception to the statute of frauds.84   However, Justice Zahra
went on to severely criticize the estoppel exception, again citing Justice Peterson’s previously
mentioned dissent in Lovely v. Dierkes,  his own opinion in Crown Technology, and Justice Scalia’s
treatise on statutory interpretation for the proposition that any modifications of the statute of frauds
should come from the legislative process, not the judiciary.85   Justice Zahra also questioned the
validity of the “absurd results” canon of statutory construction, which he argued was the basis for
the Michigan Supreme Court’s adoption of the equitable and promissory estoppel exceptions.86
Despite these criticisms, the Court of Appeals analyzed the defendant’s claim that the equitable
estoppel exception applied to the oral agreement at issue, and affirmed the trial court’s grant of
summary disposition for the defendant based on this exception.87     
Following the Court of Appeals decision, Kelley-Stehney appealed to the Michigan Supreme
88Kelly-Stehney & Assocs. v. MacDonald's Indus. Prods., 677 N.W.2d 838, 839 (Mich.
2004). 
89Id.
90 Id. at 838-41 (the issues to be considered on remand were (1) whether there was a
writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds; (2) whether Quality Products & Concepts Co. v.
Nagel Precision, Inc., 666 N.W.2d 251 (Mich. 2003), was pertinent; and (3) whether the
language of MCL § 566.136 affected the disposition of the case).
91Id. at 838-39.
92  Kelly-Stehney & Assocs. v. Macdonald's Indus. Prods., 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 264,
2-3(Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
93Id.
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Court which agreed to consider the case.88   Originally, the only issue which was to be considered
on appeal was the validity of the equitable estoppel exception to the statute of frauds.89 The scope
of the appeal was widened when the Supreme Court allowed other issues to be introduced;
surprisingly, instead of addressing the ongoing validity of the equitable  estoppel exception, the
Michigan Supreme Court chose to vacate and remand the case for a determination of issues raised
subsequent to the initial appeal, issues which were not significantly related to the equitable estoppel
exception.90  
Justice Weaver dissented from this order and strongly criticized the majority’s refusal to
address the equitable estoppel issue, arguing that the Supreme Court’s failure to address the issue
of equitable exceptions to the statute of frauds wasted judicial resources and created instability in
the law.91     On remand, the trial court considered the issues raised by the Supreme Court and again
held that the defendant was entitled to summary disposition.92      The trial court’s decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.93       
94Kelly-Stehney & Assocs. v. MacDonald's Indus. Prods., 677 N.W.2d 838, 839 (Mich.
2004). 
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Justice Weaver’s dissent from the Michigan Supreme Court’s order to vacate and remand in
Kelley-Stehney makes it apparent that the estoppel exceptions to the statue of frauds are still alive
and well in Michigan, at least as they relate to the pre-amendment portions of the statute of frauds.94
 Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged the Michigan Supreme Court’s historic stance on the
estoppel exceptions in Kelly-Stehney, the Court of Appeals did not do so in Crown Technology.
Apparently, the Crown Court believed that it was not bound by Opdyke, as Opdyke was decided
prior to the lender liability amendment to the statute of frauds.  However, it should be noted that in
Justice Weaver’s dissent to the majority order in Kelly-Stehney, no mention was made of an
equitable exception to the “pre-amendment” statute of frauds or the “original” statute of frauds;
instead, Justice Weaver referred to the equitable exception to the “statute of frauds,” which currently
includes the lender liability amendment. 
   By failing to acknowledge Michigan Supreme Court precedent, the Crown Court
minimized the role of equitable exceptions to the statute of frauds in Michigan jurisprudence, and
reached its  conclusion without carefully considering the reasons for the Supreme Court’s adoption
of said exceptions.  Had the majority in Crown more carefully considered the motives underlying
the equitable exceptions to the statute of frauds, they would have had to acknowledge that the
injustices these exceptions seek to avert may stem just as easily from the post-amendment portions
of the statute of frauds as from the pre-amendment portions.  At this time, a consideration of the
motives underlying the estoppel exceptions to the statute of frauds is appropriate. 
The purpose of the equitable exceptions to the Michigan statute of frauds is to prevent an
952d Corbin on Contracts § 275. 
96Opdyke Inv. Co., 320 N.W.2d at 840.
97Lakeside Oakland Dev., L.C. v. H & J Beef Co., 644 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. Ct. App.
2002).
98Id. at 770 (Citing Farah v. Nickola, 90 N.W.2d 464 (1958)). 
99Eric Mills Holmes, Article:  Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 Willamette L. Rev.
263, 277-279 (1996).
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unjust  and mechanistic application of the statute of frauds in Michigan.
The statute of frauds has long been a source of contention and scholarly debate, and while
the statute is unquestionably entrenched in current U.S. jurisprudence, this has not stopped critics
from questioning its wisdom.  Professor Corbin has noted that, "even as narrowly interpreted and
applied, the statute perpetuates more injustice than it prevents; and its entire repeal has been
advocated."95  The statute of frauds is most readily criticized for the rigid and inequitable results
which can easily flow from its strict application.  To counteract this problem, the previously
mentioned equitable exceptions to the original  statute of frauds arose.  To whit, in Opdyke, the
Michigan Supreme Court opined that, “estoppel and promissory estoppel have developed to avoid
the arbitrary and unjust results required by an overly mechanistic application of the rule.”96   More
recently, in Lakeside Oakland Dev., L.C. v. H & J Beef Co.,97the Court of Appeals noted that, “[t]he
statute of frauds exists for the purpose of preventing fraud or the opportunity for fraud, and not as
an instrumentality to be used in the aid of fraud or prevention of justice.”98  In a more succinct
expression of the reasons for the estoppel exception, Eric Mills Holmes states that, “the source of
‘estoppel’ is the ‘good faith’ and ‘conscience’ to promote equity and corrective justice in an
individual case.”99  In recognition of the importance of the promissory estoppel exception to the
100Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139 (1981).
101See Cal. Civ. Code § 1624 (a)(7) (2005).
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original statute of frauds, the American Law Institute codified the exception in the Second
Restatement of Contracts, published in 1981.100 
Now that the principles underlying the promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds
have been examined, it is appropriate to consider whether these same principles would support an
extension of estoppel exceptions to the lender liability portions of the Michigan statute of frauds.
The key to this consideration is the question of whether or not the lender liability portion of the
statute of frauds is any less likely than the original statute of frauds to produce unjust results when
applied in a strict or mechanistic fashion.  The answer to this question is clear: as illustrated by the
hypothetical results of the Burkhart dispute under Michigan law, noted in the Statement of the
Problem section of this paper, the lender liability portion of the statute of frauds can just as easily
produce unjust results as the original provisions of the statute of frauds.  Accordingly, the arguments
which support the estoppel exceptions to the original statue of frauds apply equally to the lender
liability portion of the statute of frauds.  
In fact, the lender liability portion of Michigan’s statute of frauds may create even more
opportunities for injustice than the original provisions, because unlike lender liability amendments
in other states101, Michigan’s amendment affects all loans, including personal, household, and family
loans.  By failing to exempt these type of loans from its statute, Michigan places largely
unsophisticated borrowers at the mercy of lenders, and if strictly construed, renders these borrowers
102Crown Tech. Park, 619 N.W.2d at 72.
103House Legislative Analysis Section, 1992, Bill 5968, page 1.   
104Id.  
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virtually no recourse should they suffer harm as a result of an oral agreement with a lender.  As
previously established, the Court of Appeals considered none of these issues in Crown Technology,
and instead employed a textualist legal argument supported by a flawed view of the legislative
history surrounding the statute.   
The Crown Court’s legislative analysis is one sided and flawed.
In Crown Technology, the Court of Appeals stated  that, “it would make absolutely no sense
to conclude that the Legislature enacted a new section of the statute of frauds specifically addressing
oral agreements by financial institutions but, nevertheless, the Legislature still intended to allow
promissory estoppel to exist as a cause of action for those same oral agreements.”102  A thoughtful
consideration of the lender liability amendment’s legislative history casts doubt upon the Court of
Appeals’ assertions regarding legislative attitudes towards the estoppel exceptions.   
The legislative analysis which was distributed to lawmakers considering House Bill 5968
makes it apparent that the principle motivation behind the bill was to prevent frivolous litigation
against lending institutions.  The analysis cites a two million dollar settlement, and the threat of law
suits stemming from aggressive advertising campaigns in which commercial lending institutions
proclaimed the availability of credit.103   In reference to the type of lawsuits the bill would seek to
prevent, the analysis noted, “these cases typically are brought by a business that has experienced a
large downturn and is making a last ditch effort to generate income....”104
Although the legislative analysis strongly indicates that by adopting the lender liability
105Crown Tech. Park, 619 N.W.2d at 72.
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portion of the statute of frauds, the Michigan legislature intended to protect the banking industry
from frivolous lawsuits; it would be a mistake to equate the desire to protect lending institutions
from frivolous litigation with the intent to leave borrowers totally unprotected from misleading and
unethical behavior by lenders.  The estoppel exceptions are extraordinary remedies only to be applied
in cases where they are necessary to prevent manifest injustice, and therefore, they have little effect
on the overall amount of litigation against lending institutions. Accordingly, the Crown Court’s
conclusion regarding legislative intent is by no means undisputable.   Outside of blanket conclusions
regarding legislative intent, the Crown Court’s primary justification for its decision stems from its
textualist analysis of the lender liability amendment.  
Despite the significant flaws in the Crown Court’s analysis, were the Michigan Supreme Court
to consider the issues raised in Crown today, they would likely affirm the Court of Appeals.
In Crown Technology, the Court of Appeals was highly critical of the promissory estoppel
exception to the statute of frauds; however, the Crown Court reached its conclusion regarding the
exception’s inapplicability to the lender liability portion of the statue of frauds based on its reading
of the text of the lender liability provision.  Specifically, the Crown Court stated that the lender
liability provision of the statute of frauds bars “an action,” and that:  
By not specifying what sort of [‘]action[‘] MCL 566.132(2); MSA 26.922(2)
prohibits (sic) we read this as an unqualified and broad ban. We also note that the
subsections of MCL 566.132(2); MSA 26.922(2) use generic and encompassing
terms to describe the types of promises or commitments that the statute of frauds now
protects absolutely. This is consistent with interpreting MCL 566.132(2); MSA
26.922(2) to preclude all actions for the enumerated promises and commitments,
including actions for promissory estoppel.105    
It must be conceded that if a strictly textualist approach to statutory analysis is applied the
106Salas v. Clements, 247 N.W.2d 889, 891 (1976). 
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Court of Appeals’ conclusion regarding the lender liability portion of the statute of frauds, said
conclusion would be correct.  Nevertheless, it should be noted that in Opdyke, the Michigan
Supreme Court failed to apply this same type of strict textualist approach to its analysis of the pre-
amendment statute of frauds.  The language of the pre-amendment statue is nearly as plain and
unambiguous as that of the lender liability amendment, and accordingly, had the Opdyke Court
applied a strict plain meaning approach to the statue of frauds, it would not have recognized the
validity of the equitable exceptions.  Even so, Opdyke was decided in 1982, and the Michigan
Supreme Court’s judicial ideology and methods of statutory construction have changed significantly
since then.  In order to determine the ultimate validity of the Court of Appeals’ decision in Crown,
it is necessary to examine the current Michigan Supreme Court’s views on statutory construction.
As any law student who has taken a class in Constitutional law is well aware, there is
currently an ongoing debate in the world of statutory interpretation between judges and scholars
favoring a strict textualist approach to statutory construction and those who apply a more purpose-
oriented approach.  The current Michigan Supreme Court’s stance on this issue is crucial to
understanding whether or not the Court of Appeals’ decision in Crown Technology is in synch with
the broader trends regarding statutory interpretation in Michigan.  One of the rules of statutory
construction at the heart of the textualist versus purposivist debate is the “absurd results
doctrine,”pursuant to which, “[d]eparture from the literal construction of a statute is justified when
such construction would produce and absurd and unjust result and would be clearly inconsistent with
the purposes and policies of the act in question.”106  The absurd results rule of statutory construction
provides courts with the flexibility to recognize and apply equitable remedies to prevent gross
107Kelly-Stehney & Assocs., 658 N.W.2d at 499 (Citing People v. McIntire, 599 N.W.2d
102 (1999) ).
108People v. McIntire, 599 N.W.2d 102 (Mich. 1999)(Michigan Supreme Court discusses
its views on statutory interpretation).
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injustice even when the plain language of a statute might not warrant such an exception.   However,
despite the Michigan Supreme Court’s earlier acceptance of the absurd results doctrine, the Court
of Appeals in Crown correctly noted that this doctrine has fallen out of favor with the Michigan
Supreme Court, which is currently dominated by textualists.107   Based on the textualist methods of
statutory interpretation currently espoused by the Michigan Supreme Court108, it is likely that were
the current Michigan Supreme Court to consider the issues which the Court of Appeals addressed
in Crown, the Michigan Supreme Court would reach a similar conclusion.  Accordingly, if the rights
of borrowers are to be protected in Michigan, they must be protected by the legislature through
amendments to the Michigan statute of frauds.      
The Michigan statue of frauds should be amended through the addition of a notice provision
regarding the validity of oral agreements, an exemption from the lender liability portion for
personal, household, and family loans, and a codification of the promissory estoppel exception
to the statue of frauds.
Given the Michigan Supreme Court’s stance on statutory interpretation, defending the rights
of borrowers, especially unsophisticated borrowers, is an issue that must be addressed by the
Michigan  legislature.  Different states have employed a number of different approaches to protecting
borrowers in their own lender liability amendments to their respective statutes of frauds.  Many of
these approaches, if adopted by the Michigan legislature, would serve to better protect Michigan
residents from unsavory banking practices, while not undermining the purpose of Michigan’s lender
liability amendment.  The three of these approaches recommended by this paper will be addressed
109Id. at 1789.
110Id.
111Kansas. Stat. Ann. § 16-118 (b)(2005).
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in turn.  
One simple way in which some states have chosen to protect borrowers from the injustice
which may result from lender liability amendments to a given state’s statute of frauds is through
strict notice requirements.109  By putting borrowers on notice that oral agreements will not be
honored by the courts, notice requirements educate borrowers and help borrowers protect themselves
against unsavory practices by members of the banking industry.  Kansas, Oregon, and Texas have
established these types of notice requirements, and was Michigan to follow their lead, it would surely
help to protect at least some borrowers from unsavory practices by commercial lending
institutions.110 
Kansas’ notice provision states as follows:    
All credit agreements shall contain a clear, conspicuous and printed notice to the
debtor that states that the written credit agreement is a final expression of the credit
agreement between the creditor and debtor and such written credit agreement may not
be contradicted by evidence of any prior oral credit agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral credit agreement between the creditor and debtor.111 
Although Kansas’ approach to notice is probably better than no notice requirement at all, it contains
flaws which make adopting a similar approach in Michigan undesirable.  The Kansas notice
provision only specifically alerts borrowers  to the invalidity of “prior” or “contemporaneous” notice
provisions, and fails to warn borrowers of the invalidity of “future” oral modifications.  The lack of
warning regarding “future” oral agreements could lead some borrowers to the erroneous conclusion
112Or. Rev. Stat. § 41.580 (3)(a). 
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that future oral modifications are not excluded by the statute of frauds.  In addition, Kansas’ statute
does not include a boilerplate and /or recommended notice clause.  To prevent confusion among
lending institutions and litigation regarding the validity of different notice clauses, the inclusion of
a boiler plate and/or recommended notice provision in the Michigan statute would be appropriate.
    Oregon’s notice provision solves the two major problems associated with the Kansas
statute by avoiding language which could confuse borrowers as to whether future oral agreements
with a lending institution would be valid, and by including a suggested notice clause.  The statute
in its applicable parts states that a lending institution:  
shall, not later than the time the loan or extension of credit is initially made, include
within the loan or credit document, or within a separate document which identifies
the loan or extension of credit, a statement which is underlined or in at least 10-point
bold type and which is substantially to the following effect:
[‘]Under Oregon law, most agreements, promises and commitments made by us concerning loans
and other credit extensions which are not for personal, family or household purposes or secured
solely by the borrower's residence must be in writing, express consideration and be signed by us to
be enforceable.[‘]112
It should be noted that Oregon’s statute of frauds not only includes a notice provision, but it also
limits the types of loans covered, exempting loans for personal, household,  or family purposes.  The
purpose and effectiveness of such provisions will be discussed subsequently.  At this point, it is
sufficient to note that Oregon’s notice provision would serve as a useful example to the Michigan
legislature, and an amendment to the Michigan statute of frauds modeled after the Oregon notice
provision would help to protect borrowers, while in no way leading to an increase in litigation
against lending institutions, unless of course, a given lending institution failed to follow the simple
113Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 26.02 (e) (2005).
114Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 26.02 (g) (2005).
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notice requirement.  
While Oregon’s statute presents a useful model, the Texas legislature has produced a
boilerplate notice clause which is slightly more clear cut, and accordingly, more effective than
Oregon’s notice clause.  The Texas boilerplate provision simply states, “This written loan agreement
represents the final agreement between the parties and may not be contradicted by evidence of prior,
contemporaneous, or subsequent oral agreements of the parties.  There are no unwritten oral
agreements between the parties.”113  The language of the Texas statute clearly indicates that “future”
oral agreements are invalid, and the boilerplate language in the Texas statute is more straightforward
than the language in the Oregon boilerplate provision.  The people of Michigan would be well served
by the incorporation of a boilerplate notice clause modeled after Texas’ clause in any notice
provision amendment.    
In addition to containing straightforward suggested notice language, the Texas statue of
frauds also includes an additional notice requirement to help protect borrowers: “All financial
institutions shall conspicuously post notices that inform borrowers of the provisions of this section.
The notices shall be located in such a manner and in places in the institutions so as to fully inform
borrowers of the provisions of this section....”114  This additional notice requirement is useful in that
it gives borrowers who might not read through contracts carefully another opportunity to become
aware of the effect that a given lender liability amendment may have on their oral agreements.  One
further notice requirement, which has not yet been codified, but which might prove extremely
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advantageous in empowering and informing borrowers, would be a requirement that borrowers  must
sign and date a form containing the notice clause prior to the financial transaction at issue becoming
enforceable by the lender.  This would further promote awareness among borrowers and is an option
that should be considered.  
 Adopting a notice provision to the lender liability portion of the Michigan statute of frauds
is the very least that the legislature can do to protect borrowers.  A provision modeled after that in
Texas, with an additional borrower signature requirement, would help to create informed borrowers,
who are more cognizant of their rights, or lack thereof.  Providing boilerplate language for financial
institutions to adopt would prevent litigation challenging the validity of a given lending institution’s
notice clause, and outside of this type of challenge, a notice requirement would in no way promote
additional litigation against lending institutions, unless, as previously mentioned, a lending
institution failed to comply with the notice requirements.  Although a notice provision standing alone
is not enough to provide borrowers with adequate protection, it is surely better than nothing, and
would be a simple first step to protecting borrowers from the injustice which can easily result from
a strict application of the lender liability portion of the Michigan statute of frauds.  
As previously mentioned, Oregon is only one of a number of states which have drafted their
lender liability amendments to protect unsophisticated borrowers from being taken advantage of by
unsavory lenders.  Perhaps the greatest difficulty posed by the Michigan lender liability amendment
is its sweeping nature, which affords sophisticated lenders the opportunity to take advantage of
everyday people who do not understand the complexities of banking practices and the rigid
application of lender liability law in Michigan.  Notice requirements are a first step towards
educating and protecting borrowers; however, a more direct and effective step would be to exclude
115Cal. Civ. Code § 1624 (a)(7) (2005).
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certain types of transactions from Michigan’s lender liability amendment.  
Oregon’s statute has already been cited and examined, but a consideration of California’s
approach sheds additional light on this issue.  Like Oregon, California specifically exempts financial
transactions for personal, household, or family purposes from the lender liability portion of its statute
of frauds:
A contract, promise, undertaking, or commitment to loan money or to grant or extend
credit, in an amount greater than one hundred thousand dollars ($ 100,000), not
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, made by a person engaged in
the business of lending or arranging for the lending of money or extending credit. For
purposes of this section, a contract, promise, undertaking or commitment to loan
money secured solely by residential property consisting of one to four dwelling units
shall be deemed to be for personal, family, or household purposes.115
If Michigan were to adopt an amendment to its statue of frauds modeled after the exemptions
contained in California’s and Oregon’s statutes, unsophisticated borrowers would be afforded even
greater protection.  It is hard to imagine that a majority of Michigan legislators intend for Michigan’s
current lender liability provision to put ordinary  people at the mercy of unsavory practices by
sophisticated lenders.  Moreover, any potential litigation stemming from disputes involving these
types of loans would typically involve far less money than disputes stemming from commercial
loans, making an exemption for personal, household, and family loans  less dangerous to lending
institutions’ financial well being.    
Like Californian and Oregon, Michigan should adopt a notice provision and an exemption
provision to exclude personal, family, and/or household loans from the lender liability amendment
116Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139 (1981).
117Ga. Code Ann. § 13-3-44 (2004).  
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to the statute of frauds.  However, although these measures would protect the most vulnerable
borrowers, they  would not protect commercial borrowers in the unique cases where the application
of an equitable exception to the statute of frauds would be appropriate.   To address these unique and
isolated situations, the possibility of codifying statutory exceptions to the statute of frauds must be
considered.   
To truly protect Michigan borrowers, a codification of the promissory estoppel exception to
the statute of frauds similar to that contained in Section 139 of the Second Restatement of Contracts
should be considered.116  Like the Second Restatement of Contracts, Georgia has codified the
promissory estoppel doctrine, although not explicitly as an exception to the statute of frauds: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.117
The Georgia codification of promissory estoppel would serve as a useful model for an amendment
to the Michigan statute of frauds, although  a few changes would be desirable.  First, the statute
would have to explicitly state that it served as an exception to the statute of frauds.  For example,
the phrase, “The statute of frauds will not prevent the enforcement of ...” could be inserted at the
beginning of the first sentence of the Georgia statute.  Second, the last sentence in the Georgia statute
should be changed so that the remedy to be granted “would be limited as justice requires,” as
opposed to the language in the statute which states that the remedy “may” be limited as justice
requires.  This change would help to narrow the focus of the statute and assure lending institutions
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and their backers that the promissory estoppel exception would provide a narrow remedy geared
specifically towards making a wronged borrower whole, not punishing the financial institution at
issue.  
The key to this proposed amendment is that it would be narrow in its scope, especially if a
notice provision amendment was also passed.  As one can imagine, if the type of notice provision
suggested in this paper were adopted, it would be extremely rare for a borrower to be considered to
have “reasonably” relied upon a lender’s oral promises.  Accordingly, the promissory estoppel
amendment would only apply in truly egregious cases, and frivolous litigation would be kept to a
minimum.   However, for the scope of the promissory estoppel amendment to be limited in a such
a way, the suggested notice provision should first be adopted, or at very least, adopted at the same
time as the proposed promissory estoppel amendment.  
Conclusion   
A codification of the promissory estoppel exception is by far the most radical of the statutory
solutions suggested in this paper, and it would likely be the most controversial.  Such an amendment
would allow for an increase in litigation against lending institutions, and it is likely that some state
legislators, who would support the less radical suggested amendments, might balk at what they
viewed as an invitation to litigation.  For this reason, there would be a danger in presenting all three
amendments in one bill, as the more radical suggestion regarding a codification of the promissory
estoppel exception could lead to the rejection of the other less dramatic, but equally important,
amendments. 
A better approach would be to divide the amendments into separate bills.  The notice
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provisions suggested in this paper would be the least controversial of the amendments, would
provide borrowers with significant protection, and should be proposed first.  After passing the notice
provision, the exemption provision should be considered, and although it would significantly narrow
the scope of the Michigan lender liability portion of the statue of frauds, it would do so to protect
unsophisticated borrowers from unsavory lenders.  Despite the banking industry’s strong lobby, it
is reasonable to assume that Michigan legislators would respond favorably to this attempt to protect
their everyday constituents.  Finally, the proposed promissory estoppel amendment should be
brought before the legislature for consideration.  By adopting the three proposed amendments, the
Michigan legislature would help to protect borrowers, while still honoring the lender liability
amendment to the statute of frauds.  By balancing the interests of borrowers and lenders in this way,
the legislature will be fashioning a system designed to promote equity and justice, whether that
means protecting borrowers from unscrupulous lenders or protecting upright lenders from frivolous
litigation.   
